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COMMENTS
TAXES - CORPORATE TAXATION - CLASSIFICATION OF PROFES-
SIONAL SERVICE CORPORATIONS FOR INCOME TAX PURPOSES.* -
Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd,
406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
A GROUP of Colorado lawyers formed a professional service
corporation pursuant to a rule promulgated by the Colorado
Supreme Court.' Plaintiff Empey, a stockholder in this corporation,
applied for a tax refund allegedly due him. When the Internal
Revenue Service failed to take affirmative action on the refund
application, Empey brought suit in federal district court.2 The gov-
ernment argued that the organization to which Empey belonged was
not a corporation for federal income tax purposes. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's determination that this
was a corporation for federal tax purposes and the regulation saying
that it wasn't, was contrary to the Internal Revenue Code, previous
case law, and previous regulations.
As a result of the decision in Empey, professional corporations
and associations have gained a stronger foothold for survival and
have become an important consideration in tax planning for pro-
fessional service people. These professional associations had traveled
an uncertain path; the developments up to Empey have formed into
a somewhat comical story of the battle between the Treasury and
the professional service taxpayer. The development and future of
the tax treatment problem for professional service taxpayers are
the subjects of this article.
The conflict on how to treat an organization for tax purposes
appeared in 1935 when the United States Supreme Court held in
Morrissey v. Commissioner3 that a trust set up to run a business
resembled an association enough to be treated for tax purposes like
a corporation. Thus, if an organization's characteristics resembled
* The Treasury officially abandoned its long opposition to corporate tax treatment for
professional service corporations in August 1969. Technical Information Release No.
1019 Aug. 8, 1969. The Release allows corporate tax treatment for those persons
incorporating under state laws professional service corporations. Currently, only four
states do not allow such corporations: Iowa, Nebraska, New York, and Wyoming.
56 TAXES ON PARADE No. 35, part 1, at 4, July 30, 1969.
1 On December 5, 1961, at the request of the Colorado Bar Association, the Colorado
Supreme Court promulgated rule No. 231, now rule 265 Colo. R. Civ. P.
2 Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd, 406 F.2d 157
(10th Cir. 1969).
3296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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substantially those of a corporation, it would be classified as an
'association," associations being taxed as though they are in fact
corporations. The Court posed four questions in Morrissey, the
answers to which should be used to determine whether or not an
organization should be treated as an association for tax purposes:
(1) whether or not an organization has a centralized management;
(2) whether or not there is a continuity of enterprise; (3) whether
or not there is a means of transferability of interests without ending
continuity; and (4) whether or not limited liability exists. The
Court, however, did not limit the test to these four attributes. It
thought inquiry should be made as to who held title to the property
was title held by an entity separate from the principals of the
organization?4 In a close case, the Court seemed to think that an
important factor to consider would be how the organization repre-
sented itself to the public.'
In 1936 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued in
Pelton v. Commissioner6 that a clinic formed by a group of Illinois
physicians should be taxed as a corporation rather than as a partner-
ship, even though physicians could not form a corporation under
Illinois law. The court agreed with the argument that the clinic was
carrying on business for a profit and had substantial similarities to
a corporate organization sufficient to qualify the organization as
a corporation for tax purposes. To determine whether or not it
substantially resembled a corporation the court used the test set up
in Morrissey.7 The court also held that national uniformity required
that the title a state gave to an organization was not conclusive, but
that the court must examine actual form and characteristics in deter-
mining how the organization should be treated under federal tax
law.8
Some professional service taxpayers, however, wanted the ben-
efit of some of the tax advantages of the corporate form. Health,
retirement, and death benefits were far greater, at lower tax rates,
and the corporation was able to deduct payments into these funds
or plans as a proper business expense. In response to these taxpayers,
the government seemed to change its position. In United States v.
Kintner,9 it has argued that a group of Montana physicians should
be taxed as a partnership and not as a corporation. However, the
court found that although the physicians could not incorporate
4Id. at 345.
5 Id. at 360.
682 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
7 1d. at 476.
8 1d. See also Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935).
9 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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under Montana law, their organization more closely resembled a
corporation than any other type or form of organization. The organ-
ization was run by some rather than all of the former partners, it
incurred debts in the name of the association, it paid federal and
state corporate taxes, its members received their compensation from
the association and not from individual clients and death or retire-
ment of one or more members would not cause dissolution of the
organization. The resemblance hence was substantially that of a
corporation, even though the interest of a member was not assign-
able as is the normal corporate interest.
A few years later, in Galt v. United States,10 a group of Texas
physicians won corporate tax treatment even though they could not
legally incorporate under Texas law. The court said:
We think the association was entitled to be treated for tax
purposes as though it was a corporation and the act of a state can
neither raise nor lower the federal taxes that may be due by the
association by whatever name it may be called under the laws of
the particular state."
On December 23, 1959, the Treasury announced newly pro-
posed regulations to show its position on professional associations.
In 1956, as expected, the Department had announced that it would
not follow the Kintnef decision. 12 However, in 1960 the Depart-
ment adopted the strongly protested "Kintner Regulations."'18 Under
the "Kintner Regulations" an organization had to have the follow-
ing characteristics in order to qualify for corporate tax treatment:
(1) associates; (2) the objective of carrying on business for profit
with subsequent division of that profit; (3) continuity of life; (4)
limited liability; (5) centralization of management; and (6) free
transferability of ownership interests. The regulations go on to say
that items (1) and (2) are of lesser importance because they are
common to both corporations and partnerships and that to be
treated as a corporation for tax purposes an organization must have
more corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics.
These new regulations ignored previous case law which held
that general partnerships could be taxed as corporations even though
they were treated as general partnerships under local law 4 and
10 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
1Id. at 362.
12 Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 598.
13 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960).
14 Burke-Waggoner Oil Ass'n. v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925); United States v.
Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Wabash Oil & Gas Ass'n. v. Commissioner,
160 F.2d 658 (1st Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 843 (1947); Popular Bluff
Printing Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1945) ; Bert v. Helvering, 92
F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1937); Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. Commissioner, 88 F.2d
156 (8th Cir. 1937) ; Cincinnati Stamping Co., 45,258 P-H Mem. T.C. (1945).
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that local law did not control how an organization was treated for
federal tax purposes.' The "Kintner Regulations" also seemed in-
consistent or more strict than previous regulations which did not
even mention limited liability or free transferability of ownership
interests.' 6 In fact, these regulations specifically state that a part-
nership lacks one of the essential requirements of a corporation:
Accordingly, a general partnership subject to a statute corre-
sponding to the Uniform Partnership Act and a limited partnership
subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act both lack continuity of life. 17
When it became apparent that to qualify for corporate tax
treatment a general partnership must incorporate under state law,
states sympathetic to professional taxpayers acted quickly. In 1961
and 1962 alone 18 states enacted laws to allow professional asso-
ciations or corporations.'
While the Treasury and professional service taxpayers were
battling, Congress was attempting to solve the root of the problem
- tax inequality between self-employed individuals and corporate
employees. The Keogh Bill, known as H.R. 10 or the Self-Employed
Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962 was delayed time and
again in the Senate Finance Committee before it was finally passed
in 1962. The Treasury was strongly against the Keogh Bill in its
original form and it was only with Treasury sponsored changes
that the bill passed at all.' 9
Because of its amended form and the delay in its approval the
Keogh Bill only partially bridged the gap in tax treatment between
corporate and professional service taxpayers. Professional service
taxpayers had their expectations raised during the debates and were
severely disheartened by the result. One effect was an increased
desire on their part to achieve corporate tax status, which led ulti-
mately to an amendment to the Bill in 1966 which narrowed the
gap, but did not close it completely.
20
This amendment altered one of the features of the original
act, that the self-employed could deduct only half of the amount
is See Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
16 For an excellent discussion of the history of this problem, see Bye & Young, Law
Firm Incorporation in Colorado, 34 RocKY MT. L. REv. 427 (1962).
1 7 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(1)(3) (1960).
18See Bye & Young, supra note 16, at 434.
19 For an interesting discussion on H.R. 10's problems and battles, see Rapp, The
Quest for Tax Equality for Private Pension Plans: A Short History of the Jenkins-
Keogh Bill, 14 TAx L. REv. 55 (1958). The new law was to take effect for taxable
years after December 31, 1962.
20 The amendment was by a rider on the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Act of
November 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 204, 80 Stat. 1577. It still gives an in-
ferior treatment to professional service and other self-employed taxpayers when
compared to corporate benefits. Incorporation should be given serious consideration
by all professional service-self-employed taxpayers.
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contributed to retirement and profit-sharing plans with a maximum
of $1,250 being deductible. 1 The amendment provides that for
those years beginning after December 31, 1967, the entire contri-
bution for a self-employed person is deductible up to $2,500 or
10 percent of earned income, whichever is less. 2 Contributions for
employees are deductible in full up to a standard limitation of 15
percent of their compensation. If both pension and profit sharing
plans are in effect, then the standard limitation is 25 percent. The
corporation has no limit to how much more it may want to contribute
to the plans as long as the contribution is the feasonable actuarial
cost of funding benefits. If the 15 percent limitation is not reached
in any year the remaining contribution deduction may be carried
forward indefinitely. However, an employer cannot deduct in any
year more than 30 percent of participating employees' compen-
sation."3
Distribution of the benefits of an H.R. 10 plan cannot be made
to a self-employed person who is an owner-employee before he
reaches the age of 5912 unless he is permanently disabled, but
benefits must start before he reaches the age of 702.4 This limi-
tation is applicable evn if the plan is terminated.21 The only restric-
tion on when benefits can be distributed to an employee, defined
as one who is less than a 10 percent partner, is that payments must
start before the age of 70 .26 Thus, an employee may receive
benefits if he retires, is disabilitated, dies, is discharged, or quits
before he reaches the age of 701/2. Total distribution of the benefits
must be made within five years of death or can be used to buy an
immediate annuity payable on the life of a beneficiary. 7
H.R. 10 plans may be pension, profit sharing, or annuity plans
and are in the forms of Trusteed plans,2 8 Annuity plans,29 Custodial
Account plans,8" U.S. Government Bond plan,3' and Face-Amount
Certificate plans.3 2 H.R. 10 originally amended twenty sections
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 relating to corporate retire-
ment arrangements and provided one additional section,33 which
21 




2 Rev. Rul. 65-21, 1965-1 CuM. BULL. 174.




29Id. §§ 401(g), 403.
3
0ld. § 401(f).
31 id. § 405.
32 Id. §§ 4 01(g), 403.
33 Id. § 405.
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described newly created bonds for investments for H.R. 10 plans.
The key sections to H.R. 10 are the sections governing qualifica-
tion84 and deductions. 5 H.R. 10 plans are more restricted in types
of investments that can be made than are corporate plans. The
earnings from H.R. 10 funds are tax free like corporate fund
earnings,8 and both have the advantage of distributing the benefits
when the beneficiary is in a lower income tax bracket than he was
when he made the contributions.
Another difference between H.R. 10, even after amendment,
and corporate plans is in discrimination (discriminatory in giving
favored treatment to shareholders, officers, persons who are high
in management, and highly paid employees). A corporation may
discriminate to a far greater extent than H.R. 10 plans can.87
Health and accident, wage contribution plans, insurance plans,
and death benefits, for instance, do not come under corporate dis-
crimination prohibitions; and those prohibitions against discrim-
ination that do, can be easily avoided in a close corporation. H.R.
10 plans must include all employees with three or more years of
continuous service, while a corporate plan has no such limitation.8
The benefits going to a corporate executive, limited only by the
prohibition against discrimination in favor of stockholders, officers,
and highly salaried employees,89 can be far better and more com-
plete in coverage. H.R. 10 plans can not get capital gains treatment for
lump sum distributions, estate tax exclusions on death benefits,"'
gift tax exclusions4' nor the $5000 tax-free death benefit4" which
are all available under corporate plans. Thus, H.R. 10, even in its
34 Id. § 401.
35 Id. § 404.
36 Id. § 501 (a).
37 Id. §§ 401(a), 401(d)(3).
38 Id.
39 Id. § 4 01(a).
40 Id. §§ 2039(c), 2039(c) (2), 2037, 2038.
41 Id. §§ 2517, 2517(b).
-1d. §§ 101(b), 101(b)(3). There are other less important differences. H.R. 10
plans vest immediately while it may be possible for corporate plans not to vest at all.
Corporate profit sharing plans may take up to 10 years before vesting and 20 years
or more for pension plans. When the corporate employee leaves the corporation he
receives the percentage of his contribution vested. Contributions for self-employed
can't exceed one-third of the total contribution to social security. There is no such
restriction for corporate plans. A self-employed cannot borrow from trust plans,
cannot buy from or sell to trusts and cannot charge for his services for the trust.
Corporate employees can borrow from the trust if adequate security is given and a
reasonable interest rate is charged, employees can buy from or sell to trusts if adequate
consideration is given, and employees can charge for reasonable value of services to
the trust. The trustee for an H.R. 10 plan must be a bank, while corporate plans
have no such trustee restrictions. As mentioned before, the distribution of benefits
under corporate plans is free from restriction and has much broader limitations on
amount of deductions, providing the requirements of Int. Rev. Code of 1954. §§ 162,
212 are complied with See Id. §§ 404(a)(1), 404(a)(3).
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amended form, does not put the self-employed on equal ground
with corporate employees.4"
Before H.R. 10 was amended in 1966, some interesting de-
velopments occurred that probably gave some extra incentive to
pass the amendment. In 1964, it was held in Foreman v. United
States44 that a group of Florida physicians should be allowed cor-
porate status for tax purposes. As in the Kintner45 and Galt46 cases,
the organization met all the Morrissey47 requirements except limited
liability. Therefore, the court held that the organization's character-
istics were substantially those of a corporation.
At this time more and more states were making it possible for
professional service corporations to incorporate. This response by
states and the current of cases against the I.R.S. caused the Treasury
to promulgate a change in the regulations in 1965.48 The regula-
tions published by the Treasury in 1960, showing its position on
professional associations, had as its first example49 a situation quite
similar to the Kintner facts except that it set forth a modified form
of transferability of interests of its members. The example also
had a striking resemblance to the Galt factual situation. However,
the new regulations deleted this example and added an additional
requirement for professional service organizations5" that made it
43 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)'(2), 403(a)(2)(A).
44 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
45 United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
46 Gait v. United States, 175 F.Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
47 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
48 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
49Id. § 301.7701-2(g) (1960), Example 1.
50 On February 2, 1965, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965) was added. The following
are the parts of 2(h) that the Empey court thought pertinent:
(h) Classification of professional service organizations. (1) (i) A
professional service organization is treated as a corporation (or as an
association and, therefore, taxable as a corporation) only if it has sufficient
corporate characteristics to be classifiable as a corporation under paragraph
(a) of this section, rather than as a partnership or proprietorship. For
purposes of determining the classification of an organization under these
regulations, the term "'professional service organization," as used in this
paragraph, means an organization formed by one or more persons to en-
gage in a business involving the performance of professional services for
profit which under local law, may not be organized and operated in the
form of an ordinary business corporation having the usual characteristics
of such a corporation. Thus, even if a professional service organization is
organized as an ordinary business corporation, this paragraph applies if
such corporation is subject to local regulatory rules which deprive such
corporation of the usual characteristics of an ordinary business corpora-
tion....
(2) . . .A business corporation has a continuing identity as an entity
which is not dependent upon a shareholder's active participation in any
capacity in the production of the income of the corporation. Furthermore,
the interest of a shareholder in an ordinary business corporation includes a
right to share in the profits of the corporation, and such right is not legally
dependent (determined without regard to any agreement among the share-
VOL. 46
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almost impossible for a professional service organization to qualify
for corporate tax treatment. This set the stage for the Empey court
battle between the Treasury and the professional service organi-
zations. 5
The judicial challenge of the 1965 regulations by a legal or-
ganization in Denver culminated in 1967 in Empey v. United States.
The district court held for Empey and the Treasury Department ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.52 In
holders) upon his participation in the production of the corporation's
income. However, the interest of a member of a professional service organ-
ization generally is inextricably bound to the establishment and continuance
of an employment relationship with the organization, and he cannot share
in the profits of a professional service organization unless he also shares
in the performance of the services rendered by the organization. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, the term "employment relationship" is used to
describe such active participation by the member and is not restricted to
the common law meaning of such term. If local law, [or] applicable regu-
lations . . . do not permit a member of a professional service organization
to share in its profits unless an employment relationship exists between
him and the organization, and if in such case, he or his estate is required to
dispose of his interest in the organization if the employment relationship
terminates, the continuing existence of the organization depends upon the
willingness of its remaining members, if any, either to agree, by prior
arrangement or at the time of such termination, to acquire his interest or
to employ his proposed successor. . ..
(5) '(i) If the right of a member of a professional service organization
to share in its profits is dependent upon the existence of an employment
relationship between him and the organization, free transferability of
interests within the meaning of paragraph (e) of this section exists only if
the member, without the consent of other members, may transfer both the
right to share in the profits of the organization and the right to an employ-
ment relationship with the organization.
(ii) . . . [If the interest of a member of a professional service organ-
ization constitutes a right to share in the profits of the organization which
is contingent upon and inseparable from the member's continuing employ-
ment relationship with the organization, and the transfer of such interest
is subject to a right of first refusal, such interest is subject to a power
in the other members of the organization to determine not only the indi-
viduals whom the organization is to employ, but also who may share
with them in the profits of the organization. The possession by other
members of the power to determine, in connection with the transfer of the
power to determine, in connection with the transfer of such an interest,
whom the organization is to employ is so substantial a hindrance upon the
free transferability of interests in the organization that such power precludes
the existence of a modified form of free transferability of interests. There-
fore, if a member of a professional service organization who possesses such
an interest may transfer his interest to a qualified person who is not a
member of the organization only after having first offered his interest to
the other members of the organization at its fair market value, the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests does not exist.
Many anticipated that the new regulations would not change the court positions
already established.
Few if any new style professional organizations will be able to meet
the standards of the 1965 regulations, but since they are "interpretive" rather
than "legislative" regulations and were issued long after the statutory
provision they interpret, they will probably not weigh very heavily with
the flood of litigated cases that can be anticipated.
B. BrTTKER & S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 38 '(2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BIrrKER].
51272 F.Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
52 See 81 I-ARv. L. REv. 1356 (1968) for initial comments.
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the 1968 November term, the circuit court affirmed the district
court's invalidation of Treas. Reg § 301.7701-2(h).
53
To provide a background for the Empey case, it should be
stated that prior to 1962, the Treasury Department prohibited cor-
porate employees from practicing before it; but in that year, the
Department amended its requirements concerning those qualified
to engage in such practice. 54 The amendment allows professional
service corporation employees to carry on their tax practice before the
Treasury Department. In response to this amendment and due to
the fact that in Colorado lawyers are permitted to incorporate under
the General Business Corporation Act,55 a group of Denver at-
torneys who specialized in tax matters decided to incorporate.
53 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969). A review of the opposing arguments is informative.
The Treasury Department argued in Empey, as stated in its appellant brief, that
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(2) clearly permits an organization incorporated
under state law to be classified as a partnership for federal tax purposes, and that if
an organization more closely resembles a partnership than a corporation in its essen-
tial and relevant characteristics it must be taxed as a partnership even though it is
incorporated under state law. The Treasury further argued that Drexler and Wald
Professional Company more closely resembled a partnership since: (1) it did not
have free transferability of interests because the stock had to be offered first to the
company and if refused permission had to be obtained to sell to an outside lawyer; '(2)
lacked continuity of life since the state supreme court could cause the corporation to
cease being one; (3) lacked limited liability because members were jointly and sev-
erally liable; and (4) lacked centralized management in the manner that they actually
operated. Finally the Treasury argued that if the regulations were invalid, Drexler and
Wald still did not qualify under the 1960 regulations and by the standards stated in
Morissey.
Ellis J. Sobol, of Drexler and Wald Professional Company, argued in the
appellee's brief that the Treasury's 1965 regulations were unreasonable, plainly
inconsistent with the statute, and amounted to administrative legislation and thus
should be void; and if the 1965 regulations were not void, the professional company
still possessed the attributes of corporate resemblance as set forth in the regulations
and the decided cases. The amicus curiae brief filed by the Colorado Bar Association
argued that corporations validly chartered under state law are included in the term
"corporation" as used in the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(a)(3), and are
excluded from the term "partnership" as used in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701 (a)
(2) ; that the resemblance test had no application to corporations that were incor-
porated under state statutes since they inevitably resemble corporations more than
partnerships; that if the 1960 regulations were applicable, Drexler and Wald would
qualify to be taxed as a corporation since it has more corporate than partnership
characteristics; and finally, that Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h), which deals with
professional service organizations, is an unreasonable and improper interpretation
of the statute. (These two briefs should be read together to get Empey's full argu-
ment, since Drexler and Wald Professional Company and the Colorado Bar Associa-
tion purposely worked together in order that they wouldn't be redundant.)
4 Circular No. 230, 1962-2 CUM. BULL. 394, 31 C.F.R. § 10.460 (1959) amended
Oct. 3, 1962, by CuM. BULL. 394.
5 Colorado is unique in that it is the only state where lawyers are permitted to
incorporate under the General Business Corporation Act by virtue of a rule of the
state supreme court. Supra note 1. The rule authorizes attorneys to form professional
service corporations under the Colorado Corporation Code. The pertinent parts of the
rule as as viewed by the 10th Circuit are as follows:
265. Professional Service Corporations and Joint Stock Companies.
Lawyers may form professional service corporations for the practice of law
under the Colorado Corporation Code, providing that such corporations are
organized and operated in accordance with the provisions of this Rule. The
articles of incorporation of such corporations shall contain provisions com-
plying with the following requirements:
A. The name of the corporation shall contain the words "professional
company" or "professional corporation" or abbreviations thereof ....
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The new corporation, called Drexler and Wald Professional
Company elected officers and began practicing law on November
1, 1962. Its shareholders signed employment contracts, as did its
nonshareholder lawyer employees. On the same date each share-
holder entered into a stock redemption contract. Cases were usually
referred to individual lawyer employees from outside sources. Routine
cases were normally handled by the individual to whom they were
referred and he would also set the fee to be paid by the client. If
the case was not a routine one or involved a major client, the board
of directors would decide what lawyer employee would handle the
case, and the board would set the fee to be paid by the client.
The Corporation performed all activities in the corporate name.
For example, it obtained short term loans in the corporate name,
entered into a ten-year lease for offices, had its corporate name
put on all stationery, office doors, and had its corporate name listed
in Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory.
In August 1963, one of the original stockholders left the cor-
poration and the corporation redeemed his stock. On November 1,
1965, one of the nonstockholder employees, Empey, purchased the
10 percent stock interest that had been redeemed. When Empey
filed his 1965 tax return he reported the salary he had received for
the first ten months before he purchased the stock and also reported
B. The corporation shall be organized solely for the purpose of con-
ducting the practice of law only through persons qualified to practice law
in the State of Colorado.
C. The corporation may exercise the powers and privileges conferred
upon corporations by the laws of Colorado only in furtherance of and subject
to its corporate purpose.
D. All shareholders of the corporation shall be persons duly licensed
by the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado to practice law in the State
of Colorado, and who at all times own their shares in their own right.
They shall be individuals who . . . are actively engaged in the practice of
law in the offices of the corporation.
E. Provisions shall be made requiring any shareholder who ceases to
be eligible to be a shareholder to dispose of all his shares forthwith either
to the corporation or to any person having the qualifications described in
paragraph D above.
F. The president shall be a shareholder and a director, and to the
extent possible all other directors and officers shall be persons having the
qualifications described in paragraph D above....
G. The articles of incorporation shall provide and all shareholders of
the corporation shall agree (a) that all shareholders of the corporation shall
be jointly and severally liable for all acts, errors and omissions of the
the employees of the corporation . . . except during periods of time when
the corporation shall maintain in good standing lawyers' professional liability
insurance which shall meet the following minimum standards:
1. The insurance shall insure the corporation against liability im-
posed upon the corporation by law for damages resulting from any claim
made against the corporation arising out of the performance of professional
services for others by attorneys employed by the corporation in their
capacities as lawyers.
2. Such policy shall insure the corporation liability imposed upon




10 percent of the corporation's income for the two months of 1965
that he held the stock, even though he did not receive this per-
centage of the corporation's income in any way or form. Empey then
filed his claim for refund for the tax difference between the 10
percent of corporate income he reported and his salary that he
actually received. After waiting six months with no action from the
Commissioner, Empey sued in the Federal District Court for the
District of Colorado.
The trial court held that the Treasury regulation which had
denied professional corporations corporate tax treatment 56 con-
stituted an inconsistent position with the Code, with the previous
administrative position, and with previous case law, and was an
exercise of a nondelegable legislative function by an administrative
agency. The trial court further stated that even if the new regu-
lations were valid, the organization met the requirements and there-
fore could be taxed as a corporation.5 7 As previously stated, the
appellate court agreed with the trial court, affirming the decision.5"
Since the landmark Empey decision, there have been other
cases in accord with the Empey interpretation of the 1965 regulation.
A group of physicians in Ohio obtained corporate tax treatment in
O'Neill v. United States.5 9 In that case, the court held that the
same regulation considered in Empey was an interpretive regulation,
not binding upon the court, and invalid. The court stated that the
only time that a corporation was not allowed to be taxed as a cor-
poration was when it failed to meet the "business purpose" test. 0
The court found that the physicians had the non-tax business pur-
pose of controlling a sizeable and unwieldy organization."' The
court cited Empey as support for invalidating the new regulation.
In Kurzner v. United States,6" a Florida medical association
won in its challenge to the validity of the new regulation. The court
held that it was unreasonable, discriminatory, and invalid and cited
Empey and O'Neill in support. In Holder v. United States, 8 a group
of Georgia physicians had like success challenging the same 1965
56 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
57 Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
58406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
59 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968), afi'd, P.H. 60,262 (6th Cir. 1969). The Sixth
Circuit said that the new regulation declared invalid in Empey was invalid only to
the extent it failed to follow the state's label of "corporation."
60 The "business purpose" test requires an organization to have a legitimate business
purpose or purposes to incorporate besides obtaining better tax consequences.
61 O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 361 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
62286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968), afljd P.H. 60,262 (5th Cir. 1969). The Fifth
Circuit based its invalidation of the new regulation on the ground that it was
discriminatory, not on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Code.
63 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
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regulation. The court reached the same conclusions as in the pre-
viously mentioned cases and found that the organization had com-
plied with the proper qualification procedure optional to the tax-
payer. 4 It was held in Wallace v. United States6" that the same
regulations were unreasonable, discriminatory, and in conflict with
the previously decided cases. Thus, the Treasury seems to have lost
its battle with professional service organizations under the present
statutes. If, however, cases go against the professional service cor-
porations, it will probably be because they failed to incorporate
with full knowledge and understanding of the proper procedures
to follow and thus failed to "dot all the i's and cross all the t's."
For a professional service organization to qualify for cor-
porate tax treatment after Empey, it must incorporate under state
incorporation or association law, substantially meeting the require-
ments of having continuity of life, centralized management, trans-
ferability of interests, and limited liability. Under Empey, it is
wise to have articles of association, setting forth a clear agreement
of incorporation; the board of directors should meet regularly and
minutes of the meetings should be taken; there should be written
employment contracts with the employees paid by the corporation;
individual clients should pay the corporation; the corporation should
pay corporate income taxes; the corporation's property and debts
should be in the corporate name; all business forms should be cap-
tioned with the corporation's name; and the organization should
hold itself out to the public as being a corporation.
Since H.R. 10 has failed to close the gap completely between
professional service taxpayers and corporate employees, incorpora-
tion might very well provide the equalizer for professional service
people. However, incorporation may be the answer for some and
not for others; it should not be automatic. It is felt that for most,
incorporation is the answer for the self-employed since he has far
superior benefits than those offered by H.R. 10.
The first problem that the professional group must face is
whether or not it would be ethical to incorporate.66 On November
4 Rev. Proc. 61-11, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 897, states that Articles of Association, By-Laws,
Employment Contracts, a copy of the state professional association incorporation law,
and the Profit Sharing Plan, Pension Plan, etc., may be filed with the District
Director of Internal Revenue so that a determination of tax treatment can be made.
622 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5880 (D. Ark. 1968).
One leading case where the court refused to permit lawyers to incorporate is In the
Matter of Co-op Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). Ellis J. Sobol, stock-
holder in Drexler and Wald Professional Company and also the attorney who argued
Empey's case, disagrees strongly with the position that it is unethical for either a
large or small law firm to incorporate. Mr. Sobol contends that reasons for incor-
poration are limitation of liability, convenient transferability of shares, greater ease
in handling a large organization, and to attract and keep qualified employees through
retirement plans, and other increased fringe benefits. The weight of decisions and
the ABA are on Mr. Sobol's side.
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27, 1961, the American Bar Association expressed the view that it
would not be unethical to incorporate if the lawyer is (1) still
personally responsible to the client and (2) if the client is made
personally aware of the restrictions on liability as to the other
lawyers in the organization. 67 In states having similar requirements
to Colorado's, this would not be a problem since the members are
either subject to joint and several liability or must provide a large
amount of insurance.
The public image of lawyers and the legal profession might
be tarnished should there be a great stampede (there has been none,
yet) to incorporate to simply obtain tax benefits.6" While many may
pass this area over lightly, it was not taken lightly by the CPA
profession. The Council of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants was so concerned with the image of their profession
and the members in it that it adopted a resolution condemning CPA's
for even supporting this type of "tax gimmick." 0
The ethical problems are not the only things to be considered.
Forming the corporation involves the trouble, time, and expense of
filing for qualification and approval of health and retirement plans.
In addition it may be quite expensive for one member to withdraw as
the market for the members share may be quite limited. Even if
there is a right to have the organization repurchase the interest, the
fair market value or price would probably be small and the cash
might not be available. Also, one might have to forfeit his pension-
plan rights if he withdraws.
All tax problems are not solved by incorporation. The organi-
zation might have to contend with the extremely high personal
holding company tax rates. 70 Generally, a personal holding company
is one controlled by a limited number of shareholders and receives
most of its income from sources specified in the Code. Amounts
received from personal service contracts are personal holding com-
pany income, according to Code § 543 (a) (7), if "some person other
than the corporation has the right to designate (by name or by
description) the individual who is to perform the services, or if the
individual who is to perform the services is designated (by name
or by description) in the ocntract ...... Drexler and Wald Profes-
sional Company had clients execute a standard form of fee agree-
ment which solved the problem by having the corporation reserve
7 ABA Comment on Professional Ethics, Opinion 303, Nov. 27, 1961, 48 A.B.A.J. 159
(1962).
6 Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HAxv. L. REV. 776, 789 (1962).
69 Editorial: Professional Association or Incorporation, J. ACCOUNTANCY 39-40 (Nov.
1961).
7 0 Note, supra note 69 at 791. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 542(a), 543(a)(7);
§ 541 imposes the high personal holding company tax rate.
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the right to designate who would perform the services and not
having the contract specify who would perform the services.
Another tax problem that the organization might meet is the
problem of reasonableness of compensation; compensation must
be reasonable in order to qualify as a deduction. 7' To avoid as much
double taxation as it possibly can, the organization will attempt to
distribute as much of its earnings as it possibly can. Also, a law
firm needs only a small cash reserve to operate. Partners of large,
well known law firms normally receive greater salaries than can be
supported by their billing time to clients. This is not to imply that
these partners are not worth what they are paid. These partners
surely draw clients to the firm and keep clients simply by their name
and reputation. Also, they fulfill administrative duties and other
services that cannot be billed to clients. Their name and reputation
may allow the organization to charge higher fees. The Commissioner
might label some of these attributes good will, and good will, if
purchased, must be capitalized7 2 and is not subject to depreciation
or amortization. Upon liquidation, the Commissioner could claim
an additional value for good will.
Concurrent with the problem of the Treasury arguing that some
salaries are unreasonable is the problem with the assignment of
income theory.7 3 The Treasury may attempt to attribute income
received by the corporation to the stockholder-employee who earned
it. The fact that he did not receive such income makes no difference.
If a legal corporation accumulates earnings for a reserve for
redemption of any withdrawing member's stock, that accumulation
may be subject to the accumulated earnings tax74 (an unsettled
point at this time). Unlike physicians and dentists, who could argue
that the reserve is needed for purchase of new or more equipment,
lawyers have little reason for such a large accumulation. It can be
argued that the business purpose for keeping a large amount of
accumulated earnings is in fact the constant, real threat or pos-
7
21 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(1).
7Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
7See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Victor Borge, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d § 69-
320 (2nd Cir. 1968).
74 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 531-37. The accumulated earnings tax on a corporation's"accumulated taxable income" is at the rate of 271/2 percent of the first $100,000 of
accumulated taxable income and 381/2 percent of any accumulated taxable income
in excess of $100,000. This tax is in addition to the usual corporate tax and is aimed
at preventing corporations from accumulating income so that stockholders won't be
taxed on dividends. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 535*(c) allows an accumulated earnings
credit in "an amount equal to such part of the earnings and profits for the taxable
year as are retained for the reasonable needs of the business." Section 535(c)(2)
says the credit allowed to accumulation "shall in no case be less than the amount by
which $100,000 exceeds the accumulated earnings and profits of the corporation
at the close of the preceding taxable year." Thus the first $100,000 accumulated
won't be subject to the accumulated earnings tax.
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sibility that one or more members will withdraw from the organi-
zation. Many of the smaller firms that would incorporate may not
have to worry about the accumulated earnings tax, since they would
not need to accumulate earnings in excess of $100,000, and prob-
ably could not if they wanted to. Large and small professional
service corporations can also argue that it is reasonable to ac-
cumulate earnings to buy an outside business for investment pur-
poses, and could point out that office equipment and furnishings
are not cheap and replacements will not be any cheaper.
If a small professional service organization decides to elect
under Subchapter S,75 it will throw itself into a not impossible
situation, but a somewhat complicated one. This maze of Code and
regulations has been tried before by professional service people
and has not been found to be very practical. 76 However, it is not
as complicated as one might at first think and this election could
be an answer to accumulated income and personal holding company
problems.
If a sole practitioner decides to incorporate and be a one-man
corporation he will have problems of qualification.77 The Code,78
regulations, 79 and Morrissey lean toward requiring more than one
person in an "association." 80 The main problem with a one-man
association is continuity of life,8 ' but Empey said that if incorporated
under state law, continuity of life would not be a problem. The
real problem areas are (a) centralized management, (b) assign-
ment of income, and (c) personal holding company treatment if
Subchapter S is not elected.82
In conclusion, before a professional service organization de-
cides to incorporate it should weigh carefully all the advantages
and disadvantages, as well as the ethical problems.
H.R. 10 is a pale substitute for a corporate plan. Incorporation
75Id. §§ 1371-77.
76 See Greene, Practitioners' Experiences with Subchapter S Reveal Many Doubts, Fears;
Use Is Limited, 10 J. TAXATION 130 (1959).
7 See BITTKER, supra note 50, at 39.
78 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701 (a)(3).
79
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1965).
80 But see Lombard Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 22 (9th Cir. 1943).
81 A.A. Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 385 (1937).
82 There also may be problems in incorporating a cash basis partnership, as shown in
Peter Raich, 46 T.C. 604 (1966). In this case petitioner tried to fall within the
provisions of Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 351 by incorporating with a tax free exchange
of his property for stock in the new corporation. Petitioner ran afoul of statute
when he received stock plus an unsecured promissory note. The court found that the
corporation assumed liabilities over the petitioner's adjusted basis of property
transferred. Thusly, Code § 357(c) was applicable via Code § 351(d) (1) and peti-
tioner should be taxed on this excess of liabilities assumed. The court also found
that the petitioner should be taxed on the amount of the note received since it was
within the meaning of "other property" received besides stock under Code § 351(b).
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for most professional service taxpayers is the best answer now
available. There are professional service people who are now being
pushed too quickly and are being ill advised by mutual funds and
insurance groups (who are the ones who stand to benefit from the
corporate form through retirement plans). Incorporation must take
place only after careful investigation and planning. The best answer
would be federal legislation that would put self-employed and cor-
porate employees on equal footing and thus end the journey into
the unknown regions and pitfalls of professional service people
incorporating. This legislation appears to be only a wish as it is




CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - BIFURCATED TRIAL - THE RIGHT TO
SEPARATE TRIALS ON THE ISSUES OF GUILT AND PUNISHMENT -
People ex rel. McKevitt v. District Court, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
C LARENCE English was charged, by direct information, with the
crime of murder in the first degree. The public defender submitted
a "Motion for Bifurcated Trial" on behalf of English, requesting
separate trials before separate juries on the issues of guilt and of
punishment. The Denver District Court ordered separate trials on
the issues of guilt and punishment but before the same jury. There-
after, on behalf of the People, the district attorney instituted an
original proceeding on a writ of prohibition against the district
court and against the judge who issued the order alleging that the
Colorado statute concerning trials for murder in the first degree'
had been misinterpreted.' The Supreme Court of Colorado, after
issuing to the district court a rule to show cause, held the rule ab-
solute and directed the trial court to reverse its order that English
be given separate trials before the same jury. The language used
81The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Randolph W. Thrower, has indicated that
the I.R.S. might attack professional service corporations through the administration's
legislative tax proposals. These proposals could be to force all Subchapter S Corpora-
tions to use "Keogh" or H.R. 10 plans rather than corporate plans. See P.H. FED.
TAx REPORT BULLETIN § 60,293-94.
1 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3(1) (1963) provides:
The jury before which any person indicted for murder shall be tried, shall,
if it find such person guilty thereof, designate by its verdict whether it be
murder of the first or second degree, and if murder of the first degree, the
jury shall in its verdict fix the penalty to be suffered by the person so con-
victed, either at imprisonment for life at hard labor in the penitentiary, or
at death; and the court shall thereupon give sentence accordingly (emphasis
added).
2 People ex rel. McKevitt v. District Court, 447 P.2d 205 (Colo. 1968).
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